Abstract-The tremendous popularity of Online Social Networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and Google+, has accustomed people to an easy and reliable process of social interactions. Inherently, the huge amount of information disseminated and the sensitive information possessed by OSNs prompted several privacy concerns. In order to increase the privacy of OSNs users, several solutions proposed the use of encryption and masking techniques to conceal profile information or the content of exchanged messages. Unfortunately, even when such countermeasures are in place, the OSNs can still infer sensitive information based on the social network structure and the behavior of users. In this paper, we present VirtualFriendShip, a novel solution that allows users to hide their real social network structure, and to browse the OSNs while keeping their actions anonymous. To do so, we introduce the concept of routing friends, which are build upon the social trust and relay other users traffic throughout a decentralized channel. We demonstrate the feasibility of our solution via a prototype implementation of VirtualFriendShip for Facebook. Alongside with a set of experiments we show that the additional costs are tolerable to end users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs), like Facebook, Google+, Pinterest and LinkedIn, have conquered current society and have become an important communication channel for millions of users. OSNs offer an easy channel for share and access published information. Inherently, OSNs store a large quantity of information which is subsequently used to generate economical revenue. For example, by using data mining techniques, OSNs are able to profile and derive distinct information about specific users to later share it with external companies for their target advertisement [1] . Consequently, OSNs are able to infer detailed and specific information about users by their shared content, behavior, actions and preferences. A recent case is the collection and surveillance run by government central intelligence agencies like NSA and GCHQ [2] . Such issues have created a large privacy and security worrisome among OSN users [3] , not beneficial for the public image and business model of OSNs.
Currently, most OSNs grant their users customizable privacy settings, allowing them to administer different levels of control when sharing information. For instance, users can select which users, or groups, can access their profile or shared information. Whilst these settings give users a certain, yet limited, level of control, they still need to rely on the trustworthiness of the OSNs providers in managing and enforcing the defined privacy settings. In addition, the privacy preferences do not exclude the OSNs providers from the loop, since OSN providers need access to the information shared to compel with their business model. Moreover, the concentration of personal information unsurprisingly exacerbates the dangers of data leaks [4] and insider attacks [5] .
To address these worrisome issues several solutions have been proposed protecting the privacy of published information, replacing it by fake or encrypted information [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . Those solutions, however, consider the problem of privacy as confidentiality of shared content, e.g., messages and profile information. While this approach allows users to hide the content of exchanged messages from the prying eyes of unwanted recipients, a motivated adversary can still learn and infer sensitive information from the behavior and the user interactions. For instance, it is possible to derive the recipients and the strength of the relationships of each user [12] . In order to hide the relationships from the OSN graph, anonymization techniques have been proposed [13] , however, sensitive information can still be derived from the behavior. In fact, protecting user behavior is an important requirement, as actions such as profile browsing and picture viewing represent the most common action in OSNs [14] . Towards a more radical approach, privacy-aware systems have been introduced as a replacement for current OSNs, mostly with a peer-to-peer design in order to move away from the current main centralized control [15] , [16] . However, the availability of data in such solutions represent a major concerns to users. More importantly, the trade off of moving away from the commonly used social ecosystem along with the risk of loosing interactions to a potential privacy-friendly system is high and a difficult step for users.
Internet users generally resort to anonymous networks, such as Tor [17] , to protect their identity when browsing online making the process of linking online behavior to an offline identity a hard task. However, major OSNs require users to create and maintain a profile, and to log in every time to use the OSN, hence, anonymity is infeasible even using an anonymous network. Still when using pseudonymous, it suffices for a powerful adversary to have access to the profile of users, shared information and social interactions to assemble the user's true identity [18] , [19] . Moreover, anonymity networks, like Tor, are often judged and subsequently blocked by global attackers [20] , [21] .
Motivated by the aforementioned discussion, in this paper, we address a different privacy issue, whereby sensitive information can be inferred from the behavior and actions of the users when browsing content in the OSN. Hence, for this means we propose our VirtualFriendship (VF) solution, along with the concept of routing friends based on the social trust as defined in [22] . In particular, we use a decentralized network composed by routing friends to route, deliver, and forward content inside a centralized OSN. In this way, users are acquainted to communicate privately towards a decentralized channel, while keeping all the benefits of centralized OSNs, such as storage and the social connections. A key point of our solution is that there is no need to envisage a complete re-design of current OSNs, nor advocate the move to new freshly privacy-friendly OSNs from all users, which would be unpractical. Instead we require only a fraction number of users to use our system. Furthermore, we have suggested different security protocols to allow users to deliver and verify access rights of published shared information to other users, even for users that are not registered in the OSN. To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our solution, we implemented an open-source prototype in the form of a Firefox extension, named VF-App. Finally, we have analyzed and showed that VF-App presents a tolerably low overhead to users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first solution that achieves such goals while preserving current OSN functionality.
Contributions: This paper makes several contributions. First, we introduce the concept of routing friends based on users social trust [22] . Second, we suggest a hybrid solution, i.e., centralized and distributed, to protect OSN user's anonymity with respect to the OSN provider. In fact, we anonymize users while browsing behavior in OSN by using the decentralized channel formed by routing friends. Third, we propose protocols that allow users to deliver, define, and verify access rights while using our solution. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility and its limited overhead via the implementation and evaluation of an open-source prototype as a browser extension.
Outline: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model and sketches the privacy requirements. Section III formalizes the architecture and operations of our system, while Section IV performs a security evaluation. The prototype implementation is described in Section V, and Section VI surveys the related work. Finally, Section VII concludes and foresees open questions.
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
This section introduces the involved entities, the adversarial model, and defines the privacy goals considered in this paper. Table I summarizes the notation used in this paper.
A. Entities
Without loss of generality, throughout the remainder of the paper, we consider two users of an untrusted centralized OSN -Alice and Bob. Each user is represented by a profile P, and controls a public and private list of relationships. Public connections C represent the list of people the user is connected in the OSN but does not necessarily trust to relay traffic. While private relationships R represent the list of connections the List of size n containing the tuples (Fu i ,Λ i ) that u can use to access content from u (pku,sku),κ Asymmetric key pair (public and private keys), and symmetric key from user u user trust socially and subsequently can relay traffic on his behalf. We consider users to browse the information in the OSN, and subsequently share information with other users using the OSN infrastructure, while, optionally, leveraging optional channels to protect their privacy. To access shared content users are required to have access rights which depends on authorization tokens. Each entity in the system is assumed to relay traffic to trusted relationships, verify access-rights, and deliver content. Furthermore, we do not consider users to perform voting actions, such as, the "like" action on Facebook.
B. Adversarial Model
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will consider a passive adversary aiming at deriving information and breaking anonymity of the users browsing OSN content. In particular, an adversary able to monitor, track and recover information of the communication in the OSN, e.g., OSN provider. An adversary with access to such information can create a generic user descriptions based on their behavior, and, subsequently obtain the main interests and the weight of their friendships [12] . Although all shared content should be kept confidential, we infer that such adversary adheres to the honest-but-curious model by following with the protocol specification and not tampering with nor deleting content. In addition, we assume that the OSN cannot create fake cheating users.
C. Requirements
Privacy in OSNs has lead to discussion and interests by the research community and the media. Yet, the problem is far from being solved, as providing a definition of privacy for OSNs is a challenging and difficult task. Hence, with respect to the security and privacy goals, we require that our system fulfills the following privacy properties.
-Requester Anonymity: We endeavor that a passive adversary monitoring traffic in the OSN cannot tell the user identity based on his browsing actions, e.g., when requesting another user profile information. In particular, the adversary cannot map the user identity to one from the set of the users connections public connections C u . More formally, we say that the anonymity of user u is given by the entropy H, such that, the closer to log 2 (N ) the higher anonymity of u, where N is the size of the set C u . Considering p i to be the probability distribution that 2014 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security the user i in C u is the requester, then, the entropy as defined in [23] , [24] is calculated as follows:
-Token Unforgeability: We require users with no access-rights to a specific content to not get access it. This means that a cheating user cannot compute the authorization access token with no-negligible probability.
-Token Privacy: We require that the authorization token should not leak any information with respect to the user accessing a specific content. In particular, the user verifying access-rights should just learn if the user holds the token, and nothing more.
-Content Secrecy: We aim at the secrecy and confidentiality of the exchanged content towards unauthorized users and the OSN provider. The authenticity of the content shared should also be protected to avoid impersonation. We acknowledge the fact that some OSNs do not accept publish of encrypted content, thus, we publish the link to the real information as in [7] , [8] .
-Communication Undetectability: We endeavor that the communication among two users to be undetectable. In other words, that it is hard for an adversary, such as the OSN, to detect that two users are exchanging information, e.g., messages, profile information. We claim that Alice and Bob are undetectable while communicating, if a bounded adversary A cannot distinguish if the two users communicating are in fact Alice and Bob with non-negligible probability.
III. VIRTUALFRIENDSHIP
We propose a hybrid architecture that enables users to communicate using the OSN centralized infrastructure through a privacy-friendly decentralized channel. In contrast to the normal functionality, users are required to utilize a local server Λ u allowing them to route traffic throughout a different channel, and optionally use an anonymous network (AN), such as Tor. In this way, users keep the main information stored in the OSN, in encrypted format [6] , [7] , [8] , [10] or replaced by fake information [9] , [11] , [25] . To achieve better privacy we introduce the concept of routing friends, F . A routing friend is a direct trusted connection in R that acts as an intermediary for actions performed by users in the OSNs, e.g., Alice and Bob. Routing friends receive and redirect requests through a decentralized network formed by others F using a AN, i.e., Fnetwork. Figure 1 depicts an overview of our system, where Alice accesses Bob's profile P Bob using F Bob2 , such that, F Bob2 ∈ R Bob . The connection between Alice and F Bob2 is performed using Λ Alice and Λ F Bob 2 that are connected through a AN. F Alice protects Alice's identity, e.g., Facebook ID or IP address, towards F Bobj .
A. Architecture
The architecture of our system involves three entities: the users, the OSN and an Anonymous Network (AN). We assume the OSN to be any centralized OSN, such as Facebook or
Anonymous Network Fig. 1 . VirtualFriend System Overview.
Google+, and to be the base communication channel where users share and store information.
For the sake of simplicity, we will consider users to be registered and represented in the OSN by a profile, e.g., P Alice and P Bob . However, the operations on the system do not change for the case that Alice is an external independent user that is not represented in the OSN. Each user in the system runs a local server Λ distinguished by an unique identifier (e.g., Facebook ID or VF username), and holds an asymmetric key pair (pk, sk). The key pair is generated when the system is deployed and the public part could be made available on users profiles, for example, using a QR code image. In the system we consider two types of users: communication users, and the routing users, i.e., routing friends.
1
-Communication users: represent the users that are actually exchanging information, e.g., Alice and Bob, where Alice requests Bob's profile.
-Routing users F : are regular users that act as the entry and exit points to the requested information on the OSN, e.g., P Bob . More formally, exit points operate the request from a user (e.g., Alice) to another routing friend from the destination (e.g., Bob). Whereas the entry points authenticate and retrieve the requested content from the OSN, e.g., P Bob . It is assumed that the entry points have equal or higher access rights than the requesting node. Network communication between communication user and the trusted routing user is made using HTML. While, optionally, the link between the two routing friends can be done using an anonymous network AN, such as, Tor. In addition, we assume that F have incentives to stay online and relay their friends traffic.
Tunneling through an anonymous network AN provides attractive security and privacy features. While the most marked is enhanced anonymity, it also offers encryption. For our system, the AN is used to provide anonymity to the content requester (e.g., Alice when requesting P Bob ), with respect to a compromised F and the OSN. The AN can be any centralized or decentralized AN, for instance, Tor [17] or Tarzan [26] respectively. Although we assume the use of Tor throughout the paper, the definition of a AN goes beyond this research paper.
B. Initialization
To bootstrap the system, Alice and Bob need to become connected, in such a way that Bob ∈ R Alice and Alice ∈ R Bob . When Alice and Bob establish a connection, they exchange an initial set of values (I u ): composed by an authorization token τ, and a list Γ represented by a subset of of entry points (i.e., routing friends) with same or higher access-rights along with their Λ information. The token τ is a random value used later for authentication, i.e., τ ← {0, 1} λ s.t., λ represents a security parameter. Currently, the token τ is a long lived token, but it can become short lived when associated with a timestamp. Inherently, users can specify a token τ per group L, assuming the anonymity set is large enough, i.e., the amount of users in the group is such that is hard to identify which one is accessing the content. In this case, the τ may be generated from a lower branch of a hash tree [27] .
Let Enc pk (·) and Sign sk (·) represent an asymmetric encryption and a digital signature algorithms, respectively, {·} κ a symmetric authenticated encryption (e.g., AES in CCM mode [28] , or a dedicated scheme [29] ), and H(·) a collision resistant hash function. The initialization protocol, as depicted in Figure 2 , is a two-step protocol initiated by Alice. First, Alice encrypts (using pk Bob ) I Alice along with a random nonce N , and adds a signature for I Alice . Bob, on the other hand, decrypts and verifies the authenticity of the content. Then, Bob replies with the authenticated symmetric encryption of I Bob . As Bob can specify different groups, such that, for example, Alice ∈ L W ork Bob , then a subset or all members from L W ork Bob are in Γ n (Alice,Bob) . Subsequently, the overhead storage for Alice with respect to τ Alice is linear with the number of groups. Whereas the overhead storage for each τ ui , such that, u i ∈ R Alice , is linear with the size of R Alice . For revocation, Alice re-generates a new τ and shares with the connections with the affected connections, either all or from a specific group. This, however, creates a linear communication overhead. In practice, this process is operated between Λ Alice and Λ Bob , using the unique identifiers as the local server addresses throughout the F -network. As it is performed in encrypted format, it can be executed directly in-band (e.g., inside the OSN) or using an out-of-band communication channel (e.g., email). A different approach, yet less efficient but achieving forward security, is to use anonymous credentials [30] , [31] . In particular, Bob acts as an issuer and issues a credential to each friend he concedes access rights, e.g., Alice. Consequently, Alice to access the profile of Bob produces a one time τ represented by the proof of knowledge of the credential issued by Bob, which is then verified by Bob or any F Bob , acting as verifiers.
C. Accessing Content
The process of accessing content in the OSN represents the most common action performed by OSN users [14] . In order to access Bob's content, Alice follows the three-step protocol illustrated in Figure 3 . For ease of exposition, we consider that Alice requests P Bob . However, this is easily extended to any generic content or message m in the OSN. The three-step protocol is described as follows:
allows to construct an extra bridge in cases Tor is blocked on Alice's side. We observe that this protocol could be extended to use anonymous credentials, where Alice presents the proof of knowledge of a credential issued by Bob.
Authenticate Request:
To access the content, Alice needs to provide a proof that she holds τ Bob . F Bobj also possesses τ Bob and is able to produce the same MAC output as the one sent by Alice. If the authentication fails, Λ F Bob j replies ⊥ to Alice indicating a reject on accessing the content. Otherwise, Λ F Bob j retrieves and encrypts P Bob using a hash of the token as the key. For requests where L is only composed by Alice, these can only be processed by Bob directly.
3. Process Request: Upon the content is received, Λ Alice decrypts and verifies µ Bob using H(τ Bob r) as the key. In this way, Alice retrieves anonymously the P Bob from the OSN, while the OSN is kept oblivious. Actually, in the prying eyes of an adversary it is F Bobj that accesses and retrieves P Bob from the OSN.
D. Exchange Messages
We now discuss how to privately send/read a message. For ease of exposition, we assume that there is only two participants -Alice and Bob, and later we discuss the scenario of multiple recipients. In contrast to the previous protocol, this protocol cannot explicitly use one F Bobj , and thus, uses directly Λ Bob . Also. both users are required to be online. In practice, Λ Alice performs an initial check to verify if the peers are online before engaging the chat. As the goal is to avoid the communication to be undetectable and observable by the OSN prying eyes, Alice and Bob establish a direct point to point secure channel, such as TLS [32] , for the communication. An overview of the protocol is illustrated in Figure 4 . Since the cryptographic operations are handled by the components Λ Alice and Λ Bob , the authorization access procedure does not affect the usual usability flow.
On the case of multiple recipients, for instance, when Alice exchanges messages with Bob, Charlie and Dave, then multiple
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Alice(τ Bob ) Alice:
... Alice ↔ Bob: {m i } κ secure channels are used. This would largely increase the overhead of the communication. However, privacy often comes at a cost, and we argue that this overhead is an unavoidable privacy trade-off. A possible extension will be to use the OTR protocol [33] , however, contrarily to the deniability requirement of OTR we endeavor that recipients know the message sender.
E. Posting Comments
Posting comments usually involves multiple recipients. As aforementioned we aim to keep the users identity anonymous, i.e., keeping the OSN oblivious on who is involved in the interactions. Naturally, Alice cannot post a comment directly to Bob's profile as her identity would be compromised, nor use a routing friend F as it may lead to impersonation and, subsequently, to social issues. With our approach, Alice uses Bob to place the comment on her behalf on his profile P Bob . The process can be briefly described as follows. First, Alice sends Bob an encrypted message containing the message and the intended recipient set. Consequently, Bob authenticates Alice and publishes the comment in his wall, to be intended for the limited set of recipients. In this way, Bob can verify the post before being published, edit and publish. For other users comments, our system operates as depicted in Figure 5 . Note that, to provide a comment, users must prove knowledge of the τ Bob . Each message/comment on the system is composed by the tuple message, user that published the comment and a digital signature for integrity of such user. Currently, the protocol illustrated in Figure 5 does not enforce any kind of access control and its secret κ does not provide forward secrecy. However, this can be achieved with the usage of broadcast encryption techniques [34] , [35] . Post comments process, where {·}κ represents a symmetric authenticated encryption under the key κ.
IV. SECURITY EVALUATION
We now turn to analyze the security and privacy resilience of our system under a passive adversary like the the OSN. We demonstrate that such an adversary does not learn the interactions occurring, whether working independently or in collaboration with one of the routing friends. Furthermore, we show that a routing friend with no access to the content cannot authenticate himself to access unauthorized content by impersonating other.
Token Unforgeability and Privacy: We consider that a cheating user cannot learn any information about the requester nor produce a valid request along with the proof of the authentication token τ, i.e., ψ ← M AC τ (r) for a given value r. The later roughly means that if an adversary A that can produce ψ can, with the same probability forge the valid output of a secure MAC. We consider that the MAC used is a pseudo random function (PRF) [36] , such that, PRF: K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} t , where τ ∈ K. In particular, we require that such adversary A, can win the following game with negligible probability:
1. Give A access to an oracle O : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} t . 2. Allow A to repeatedly interact with O:
a. Retrieve ψ ← O(r), for some r ← {0, 1} n . b. Request the content P to F , with access rights to P, by sending the tuple (ψ , r).
The oracle is either the MAC or a random function, and the PRF-advantage of A is given by the difference in probability of A outputting 1, P r[ψ ← A O(·) ] when O is a MAC, versus when O is a random function, i.e., 1/2. Considering a secure 2014 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security MAC to be a PRF, such as CBC-MAC [37] , [38] , then the advantage of A is negligible, and bounded to its output size, i.e., 2 −t . In addition, by using a secure MAC its output does not reveal any information about the identity of the sender as it is indistinguishable for any random output. In this way, our system also achieves token unforgettability and privacy.
Currently we do not protect against forward secrecy, thus, the same tuple (r, ψ) can be used by a cheating user to authenticate to a specific content. However, we consider the exit user to be trusted, and the entry point to have no motivational reason as he already possess equal or higher access rights to the requested information.
Content Privacy: As content privacy we consider that the content shared is kept secret towards any unauthorized recipients. We assume that the encryption schemes used are semantically secure, thus, it is hard for an adversary to distinguish the encryption from random noise. In fact, by using a secure authenticated encryption scheme, such as AES-CCM [28] or AEGIS [29] when retrieving the profile and while exchanging messages provides confidentiality and message authentication. Only authorized recipients are able to decrypt the content, and the authenticity of the message is protected by strongly unforgeable signature scheme [39] . In addition, Tor also provides extra encryption of the communication by applying the onion routing mechanism.
Anonymity: Even if information is exchanged in encrypted format it does not directly provide anonymity, as traffic analysis tools present a powerful tool to identify the user communication without knowledge of the content. Therefore, for our system to achieve user anonymity, Alice should not be identified when accessing, for instance, Bob's profile. To quantify the anonymity of our system, as aforementioned, we utilize the entropy metric as proposed in [23] , [24] . Towards this means we classify two possible passive adversaries, with different capabilities: the OSN provider, and the entry point F . Whilst the OSN connections C of a user are publicly known, the trusted connections R are partially known by F . In fact, this also allows the use to hide the full connection graph as the requestor of information may no be represented in C nor in the OSN. In addition, it is up to the users to disclose the same set Γ among the F , i.e., being composed by the full list L . For simplicity of description we evaluate the anonymity under the scenario where Alice initiates a request to retrieve Bob's profile P Bob , while using F Bob as the entry point. That actually, along with the browsing pictures, represents the most common action performed by users in Facebook [40] .
Considering the scenario where the OSN acts adversarial and has no knowledge that users are using our system, then the request of F Bob on behalf of Alice is indistinguishable from any other request from F Bob as F Bob ∈ C Bob . In contrast, if OSN is doubting, then the anonymity depends on the probability distribution p i of each member in R Bob of being the requester. Assuming no previous knowledge, then p i = |C Bob | −1 , i.e., each connection has equal probability of requesting information. For the case where the adversary controls the F Bobj , then, it would have more knowledge, as Γ may leak more information together with C Bob . In the case that Bob shares the same Γ with all the F, then
As demonstrated by Ugander et al. [14] most Facebook users have a median number of connections of 100. Hence, assuming Bob is an average Facebook user with |C Bob | = 100, then the maximum entropy value is H A = 6.6 bits. Furthermore, Thereby, assuming that for a user with 100 connections the group size is in average of size 15, i.e., for cases where Γ Bob = L Bob . Then the maximum anonymity achieved towards a cheating F Bob is in average H A = 15 × ((1/15) log 2 (15)), i.e., H A = 3.90 bits.
By using the routing friend along with Tor provides good level of anonymity, as the entry point does not learn the identity of the exit point nor the requester. Besides the extra security and privacy features offered by Tor, it also comprises other issues. For instance, Johnson et al. [41] showed that Tor users are susceptible to realistic adversaries. On the case that the entry point of Tor is compromised, then the adversary can only infer that F Alice is making a request. However, even if such a powerful adversary deduce the system is in use it is hard to identify the link between F Alice and Alice. In fact, using F Alice the anonymity is bounded to the connections of C F Alice . The problem with respect to the Tor entry nodes has been explored, with several other solutions being presented [42] . We acknowledge that Tor can be blocked by the network or a more powerful adversary. However, as communication between the requester and the exit point is assumed trusted and done by plain HTML, then the exit point can act as a bridge to Tor.
Communication Undetectability: It is hard for the OSN to predict that Alice and Bob are communicating, i.e., exchanging messages or placing comments. In fact, the communication is executed by Λ Alice and Λ Bob using a different channel from the OSN, thus, outside the prying eyes of such adversary. In addition, on the case a stronger adversary (e.g., a government authority) colludes with the Internet Service Providers and listens to the communication, he cannot retrieve the shared secret and thus decrypt the communication. Although, such adversary can infer that Alice and Bob are communicating by monitoring both users.
Finally, the anonymity and privacy increases directly with the increase users of our system along with the routing friends available by each user. In particular, the larger the anonymity sets are, the higher the possible anonymity and privacy of users. Although Tor provides nice security and privacy features, does not provide end-to-end communication. Thereby, if the adversary controls the OSN, the exit point F Alice and the entry point F Bob , then the adversary can detect requests made by Alice. However, we do not protect against a global end-to-end protection, such as timing and correlation attacks.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the viability of our proposal, we implemented a proof-of-concept prototype as a Firefox extension, named VF-App. 2 In this section, we describe the architecture, the implemented processes, and the performance analysis of our implementation.
A. Architecture
The architecture of our VF-App is illustrated in Figure 6 . In particular, VF-App has two components: a requester compo-nent (VF-Requester) and a routing component (VF-Router). The former executes and processes the requests, whereas, the latter routes, authenticates and retrieves the requested information. Both components are embedded and run as an unique browser extension.
VF-Requester: this component manages the user interface, and performs the user requests to the local server.
VF-Router: operates as a local server that relays traffic in twofold: (1) as a client to forward VF-Requester requests through Tor using Vidalia; 3 and (2) as a server to relay, authenticate, and realize other users requests. The Facebook information is requested by means of a Facebook specific query (FQL) along with a Facebook authentication token. Each user local server uses currently port 8765, and has an associated web address to be contacted, such as IP or domain name base addresses. This allows, for instance, Λ Bob to be reached by Λ Alice .
The current prototype is compatible with Firefox 14+, and because it is written in plain Javascript could be easily ported to other browsers (e.g., Chrome). Besides its easy installation, VF-app requires Vidalia for tunneling through Tor. The communication between the user and his trusted routing friends is performed in plain HTML to avoid blocking. To build the server side we used NodeJs, 4 and to convert HTTP requests into SOCKS, the protocol operated by Tor, we used Polipo. 5 Whereas, the cryptographic operations are executed using the Stanford Javascript Crypto Library (SJCL) [43] . 
B. Processes
Now we overview the VF-App implemented processes.
1) Bootstrap:
To bootstrap the system, users establish connections with their friends. Each user exchanges a JSON file containing the initial set of information I composed by the token τ, the list of possible routing friends Γ, and a symmetric key. Currently, this process is done automatically via email, however, it could be implemented via other offline channels. The list of friends is stored locally as a JSON object.
2) Information Request: The process used by Alice to retrieve anonymously the profile of Bob is depicted in Figure 7 , and summarized as follows:
1) The VF-App of the requester chooses at random a exit point F Bob from the list Γ n (Alice,Bob) , and entry point F Alice from R Alice . Then, produces a authentication proof ψ using a MAC and attach to the HTML request sent to F Alice , such that ψ = M AC τ Bob (r).
2) F Alice forwards Alice's request to F Bob using Tor. 3) F Bob receives the request, and verifies the authenticity of the request using τ Bob . Then, F Bob as it signed in to Facebook, collects the Facebook token for authentication, and makes a FQL 6 request. 4) F Bob processes the Facebook reply with the requested information, e.g., P Bob . 5) F Bob encrypts P Bob using Bob's shared key, and forwards the encrypted result to F Alice . 6) Finally, F Alice redirects the response to Alice, which is able to decrypt and access the requested information.
Step 1: Alice requests PBob
Step 2: FAlice forwards Alice's request
Step 3: FBob requests PBob to Facebook
Step 4: Facebook replies with PBob
Step 5: FBob sends PBob
Step 6: Alice receives PBob We underline that the first and last steps of the protocol are performed by the VF-Client, while the remainder are executed outside the OSN network by the VF-Router component, . The above steps and actions are automated and transparently to the user, whereas the OSN provider is kept oblivious of the action request, i.e., that Alice accesses P Bob .
C. Performance
In order to analyze the practical usability and performance of our system, we have measured the two most costly factors: the cryptographic overheard added for token protection and authentication of the requested content; and the average communication overheard required for a profile request. AES-CMAC [37] was used for the MAC implementation and AES-CCM [28] for authenticated symmetric encryption from the SJCL [43] library. The cryptographic overhead of the authentication process is resumed to MAC implementation which takes about 2ms. Whereas the authenticated symmetric encryption of the full profile (approximately 80kB) takes about 10ms. The average communication overhead compared to Facebook normal browsing is illustrated in Figure 8 . We started to compare by extracting just the personal information, and later we studied the impact when retrieving the full profile along with recent timeline events. Our results show that there is a significant difference on performance, however, we consider to be a tolerable cost to the user. Also, with extra optimization work we believe to reach negligible cost. 
VI. RELATED WORK
Along with the increased popularity of OSNs several privacy concerns start to arise which have prompted a large interest within the research community. A number of studies have enumerated privacy issues and challenges in OSNs [44] , [45] , [46] , [47] . More recently, Diaz et al. [48] reviewed the state of the art and defined several open questions with respect to privacy in OSNs.
Currently, most proposed solutions aim at protecting user's published content information which is directly available to OSN providers, such as profile information, status updates, comments, and images. FHEO [11] proposed the use of canvas images to protect users' information from automated analysis. NOYB [9] and FaceVPSN [25] suggested the use of fake information protect Facebook users profile information. While systems like [6] , [7] , [8] , [10] apply cryptographic mechanisms to enforce confidentiality and access control to the published content shared by the users. However, even if the content is protected using such solutions, the anonymity issue is not considered and, thus, an adversary can still derive sensitive information from the interactions or behavior. Facebook, for example, utilizes information from the interactions to acquire the top friends of each user and, subsequently represent them by order in the chat and likes of each post.
Balsa et. al. [12] address a different, yet equally important, class of privacy issues, where sensitive information can be inferred from user behavior in the OSN. They have studied and analyzed the privacy guarantees when users introduce dummy traffic. The issue with this solution is the extended storage overhead that each user needs to generate and dump into the OSN.
Others take a more drastic approach by proposing new systems to replace existing OSNs. For instance, Diaspora [16] and Safebook [49] , are mainly based on decentralized architecture.
Unfortunately, these solutions rely not only on the availability of peers but also on the assumption that a large mass of users move to a new system, in detriment to existing ones where all their friends are.
In contrast, the systems in [22] , [50] abuse the OSN social graph as mixers to provide anonymity. Drac [22] is an architecture that aims at deliver anonymity and unobservability for low-volume communications, e.g., chat messaging. Whilst Pisces [50] is a decentralized anonymous communication system suggested as an alternative to Tor [17] . Both assume the social trust of OSN friendships to initiate and relay anonymous traffic. Furthermore, the Dynamix system [51] analyzes how anonymity is affected when the social graph is dynamic. However, such solutions present a different threat model, and do not aim to address privacy concerns in OSNs. In particular, the OSN is used to imply social trust of connections. Furthermore, due to the fact that users require to be registered and logged in when using OSNs, the direct use of the later systems does not really help to protect users anonymity towards the OSN provider.
VII. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the limited effectiveness of current privacyenhancing solutions aiming at protecting behavior anonymity in Online Social Networks (OSNs), this paper presented a solution to mitigate the problem of privacy of users when performing actions and browsing centralized OSNs. We considered an adversary that is able to link users actions with his identity and further derive extra sensitive information with respect to the users. We provide a solution that allows users to anonymous browse OSNs with the use of a decentralized network composed by routing friends as social trusted relays. In addition, we allow users to define access rights to a limit set of users even if they are not represented in the OSN. We also propose private and secure protocols that allow users to share content. Finally, towards a prototype implementation we demonstrated the feasibility and efficiency of our solution. Specifically, we showed that the introduced overhead is limited and believed to be tolerable to end users.
Our current solution, as discussed throughout this paper, did not plan nor solved all the privacy issues on OSNs. Therefore, we foresee potential future work and open questions. In particular, extensions with the implementation of comments, revocation of users without re-distribution of access tokens, and address anonymity of actions such as "like" in Facebook. Moreover, we aim to extend and improve our proof of knowledge implementation into a fully functional and more efficient open source application. Taking into account that a large mass of OSN users use mobile devices to connect to OSNs [52] , we plan to develop a mobile version. This actually becomes an attractive and useful extension, as it will help to improve the anonymity and availability of peers in our system.
